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Interlinking of rivers - II
By A. Vaidyanathan
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It is difficult to believe that the interlinking
programme has been worked out in sufficient detail to qualify for
serious examination, leave alone immediate implementation.
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ENTHUSIASTS OF interlinking of rivers tend to be dismissive of the
concerns over the environmental and human consequences of the project. They
claim that these fears are vastly exaggerated or argue that they are
unavoidable costs of "development" and that they should not be
allowed to hold back the project. One has to be extraordinarily insensitive
not to recognise the consequences of ignoring these aspects in our water
resource planning in the past. They are reflected in the callous manner in
which displaced persons have been treated, land degradation due to misuse of
water, depletion of groundwater and the growing pollution of water sources.
The experience of the Indira Gandhi Canal is a stark example of the problems
arising in the wake of bringing in vast amounts of water without adequate
understanding of and concern for its impact on the fragile desert ecology.
There are also good reasons to be sceptical about the state of
preparation for the interlinking projects. Anyone familiar with the planning
of projects such as Bhakra Nangal and Sardar Sarovar knows that the detailed
investigations and site surveys preparatory to the design and the analyses
and studies needed for the actual design take many years of intensive effort
and expense by a large body of experts in diverse fields. A mega project of
such complexity as interlinking of rivers calls for preparatory work of far,
far greater dimensions. Moreover, the quality of preparatory investigations
and surveys for many, if not most, of the irrigation and water resource
projects leave much to be desired. Inadequate investigations, changes in
scope and design, huge cost escalations and inordinate delays in completing
projects are all-too-familiar features of irrigation planning in the recent
decades.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the
interlinking programme has been worked out in sufficient detail to qualify
for serious examination, leave alone immediate implementation. The best way
to counter this scepticism is to make all the studies, analyses and reports
available for public scrutiny.
There is little authenticated information on the likely cost of the
programme and its various component projects. Figures as high as Rs. 5,600
billion are mentioned but no details are available. This is about 50 times
the total allocation for the ongoing water resource development projects in
the Tenth Plan.
In a situation of severe resource scarcity, the question of the relative
priorities to be accorded to the improvement of existing facilities and the
expeditious completion of viable projects on hand as against mega projects
based on questionable premises is particularly relevant. This issue ought to
be debated seriously. Questions about the sources of funds for interlinking
tend to be dismissed cavalierly. The notion that private sources can be
attracted is the height of naivete and wishful thinking. A Government
already saddled with huge public debt, and whose precarious fiscal situation
continues to deteriorate rapidly, can hardly expect the financial
institutions to fork out such large sums for a programme, the content and
economic viability of which have not been assessed.
There are also important institutional and legal issues to be sorted
out. There is no provision for any mechanism to deal with matters concerning
inter-basin transfers. The Centre has no legal authority to decide on this
and no State will agree to vest the authority with the Centre. There is talk
of deciding these matters through consultation and consensus among the
States. One can hardly take this seriously, given our experience with the
working of existing laws and procedures for dealing with water allocation
between the States within the same basin. The allocation of water among
riparian States even within a single river basin has so far been determined
by law through negotiated legal agreements and treaties, and by judicial and
quasi-judicial mechanisms such as tribunals. We know from experience how
contentious, prolonged and difficult this process is. The awards themselves
have so far been accepted as binding on all the States concerned and the
Centre. But the implementation of these awards has given rise to innumerable
inter-State conflicts, which the Centre, despite the powers given to it
under the law and its financial clout, has been unable to prevent or settle.
These disputes and conflicts are the subject of numerous litigations. The
courts have been cautious in dealing with these cases and have instead
suggested that they be settled through mutual discussion, arbitration,
Central mediation and other extra-judicial mechanisms.
This caution is both wise and understandable, given the complexity of
the issues involved and the fact that courts have no means to enforce the
judgments and the record of compliance by Governments is at best mixed. No
judgment or award can satisfy all the interested parties. Indeed, of late,
the States are pleading their inability to enforce court judgments on
grounds that they are unfair and likely to cause unmanageable law and order
problems. Instances of Governments condoning blatant violations of their own
rules regarding allocation of uses of water and acquiescing or even
permitting the violation of established rules regarding the rights of access
and use are distressingly widespread.
These questions are pertinent and basic to a considered assessment of
the river-linking programme. In the absence of satisfactory answers,
criticisms of the decision to go ahead with the implementation of the
project are reasonable and legitimate. The current discussions in the media
and on public forums hardly focus on these issues, much less help allay the
apprehensions. That would call for a serious, open and informed debate based
on facts and analyses. Regrettably, apart from a few sketch maps purported
to be taken from the Hashim Commission report, very little information on
the specific schemes envisaged, details of their design, environmental
impact, displacement, and likely costs and benefits is available in the
public domain.
Even the main report of the Commission, though claimed to be a priced
publication, cannot be obtained from either the Ministry or the Publications
Division. The annexure to the report, in which the details have reportedly
been discussed, are considered secret.
Time was when the opinions of the Government's irrigation establishment
were accepted without much question. Times have changed. There is much
greater awareness now that there is more, much more to water resource
development than constructing dams and canals, that the process of scrutiny
and appraisal is at once too narrow, too lax and too secretive, and that
there is now a sizeable body of knowledge and expertise on water resource
management outside the Government. The assessments of the engineering
establishments are no longer taken as beyond challenge. Hardly anyone takes
seriously, much less accepts, the claim that "the National Perspective
Plan (linking rivers) has been drawn up by a scientific and professional
organisation, conceptually and technically upheld by the Technical Advisory
Committee of the Ministry of Water Resources, the Central Water Commission
and the National Commission on Integrated Water Resources Development
Plan... " and that "... the studies have been ratified by
engineers, sociologists and economists". If this is so, why should the
details of these studies and appraisals be a closely-held secret, instead of
being made public to facilitate informed discussion?
The least that Suresh Prabhu, head of the task force on interlinking
rivers, can do is to make all the relevant reports and documents available
to the public and provide an opportunity for various interested "stake
holders" to voice their concerns.
(Concluded)
Courtesy http://www.hinduonnet.com
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